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1. INTRODUCTION 
The consumers of over-the-air (OTA) broadcasts value both variety and reception. 
With the current technology and constrained broadcasting spectrum, an improvement 
in any of these factors comes at the expense of the other. An expansion of the number 
of OTA broadcasters increases programs’ variety and the heightened competition 
improves programs’ contents, but the increased spectral congestion intensifies 
interferences. This tradeoff is the focal theme of our analysis of the optimal control of 
a spectrum allocated to OTA broadcasts. Our focus on this theme is briefly motivated 
by historical and contemporary evidence from the OTA broadcasting industries in 
technologically advanced countries.  
     Due to the public good nature of OTA broadcasts and their educational, cultural 
and political impacts and due to scarce bandwidth and high sunk costs, broadcasts and 
entry rules have been tightly regulated in all major OECD countries (cf., Webbink 
1973). Until the late 1970s the television broadcasting industries in OECD countries 
comprised only a handful of licensed and highly protected public and commercial 
firms. Since the 1980s alternative transmission techniques, such as satellite and cable, 
have created a more favorable environment for entry into the television broadcasting 
industry. Yet veteran incumbent OTA broadcasters’ focus on nation-wide audience 
and their market shares have remained very high (cf., Motta and Polo, 1997; Caves, 
2006). The radio broadcasting industries have been less concentrated and more 
localized, but also entry to these industries has remained highly regulated due to sunk 
costs and tight spectrum constraint. In many European metropolitan areas, OTA radio 
broadcasting includes 20 to 80 FM stations and similar numbers of AM stations. 
Metropolitan areas in Italy offer the largest FM variety. With only 50 kHz separation 
between stations, they have the most heavily congested FM broadcasting spectrum in 
Europe.  
     Congestion generates interferences. The intensified tradeoff between variety and 
reception has been recently stressed by the Electronic Communication Committee 
(ECC) within the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications 
Administrations (CEPT, 2010).1 The recent adoption of digital transmission 
                                                 
1 "The available [FM] spectrum (20.5 MHz) constitutes a limited resource that is used intensively in 
Europe. In many countries the introduction of new FM services is difficult and may lead to an 
unacceptable degradation of existing services." (CEPT, 2010, Section 1, P. 5) … "The FM spectrum is 
in many areas overcrowded and may be reaching saturation if the high quality of reception and existing 
coverages must be retained. This results in FM services increasingly being interference-limited by 
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technologies has expanded the scope for program variety in both the television and 
radio broadcasting industries. Digital technology is spectral efficient — it can increase 
the number of channels six-fold (cf., Adda and Ottaviani, 2005). The adoption of 
digital technology by American OTA broadcasters in 2007 and the subsequent turning 
off of analogue signals in 2008 have freed a significant UHF space. However, the 
spectral gains have not relaxed the US television broadcasting industry’s spectrum 
constraint. The spectral dividend of the digital switchover was mainly auctioned off to 
large telecommunications carriers in order to accommodate the deployment of 4G 
mobile-phone networks. Similar diversion of the digital switchover’s spectral 
dividend is expected in the rest of the OECD countries. The situation is more complex 
for radio broadcasting as only few countries have successfully adopted and rolled out 
digital platforms for radio transmissions, and even fewer have clear digital switchover 
plans for analogue radio broadcasting. Still, buffer zones between broadcasters’ bands 
have to be reduced in order to accommodate new entrants to the OTA broadcasting 
industry.  
     Despite the digital switchover, expansion of the OTA broadcasting industry can be 
expected to intensify the tradeoff between variety and reception in the pursuit of the 
overall quality of programs. The variety-reception tradeoff is likely to be most 
prominent under a deregulatory scheme that allows free entry and exit. In view of the 
recent broadcasting spectrum deregulatory trends (cf., De Vany, 1998; Hazlett, 2008) 
and the variety-reception tradeoff, our theoretical analysis explores the optimal 
steady-state number of OTA broadcasters and its stability when entry and exit are 
motivated by above-normal profits and moderated by sunk costs. We treat the 
broadcasting spectrum as a state-owned, time-invariant, scarce natural resource. As in 
the case of any other state-owned natural resource, governments are entitled to 
royalties on its use. Hence, in addition to the direct benefits from the service provided 
by the broadcasting industry, there are indirect benefits—the public services financed 
by the states’ royalties on this natural resource.  
     We construct a conceptual framework where the state’s royalties are allowed to 
vary over time so as to maximize the sum of the discounted direct and indirect 
benefits stemming from the use of the broadcasting spectrum. The number of 
broadcasters is allowed to adjust to the above-normal profit from broadcasting at a 
                                                                                                                                            
design or otherwise and these higher interference levels may have to be accepted to allow the 
introduction of many more additional services". (CEPT, 2010, Section 2, P. 5) 
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rate moderated by sunk costs. The broadcasting industry’s above-normal profit is 
assumed to rise with the quality of the broadcasting industry’s service. On the one 
hand, entry increases variety, heightens competition and, in turn, raises the quality of 
the industry’s service. On the other hand, entry increases spectral congestion and the 
intensified interferences lower the quality of the industry’s service.  
     The possible sensitivity of the consumers’ incomes to the quality of the industry’s 
service is another central theme in our analysis. In constructing the optimal control 
model, we take into account two opposing effects of the quality of the service on the 
consumers’ incomes. On the one hand, the information disseminated by the 
broadcasts enhances knowledge, forms standards of performance and generates 
transactions. On the other hand, broadcasts divert time from work and other modes of 
investment in human and social capitals. The higher the overall quality of the 
industry’s broadcasts (variety and reception) is, the stronger these opposing effects. 
The net effect of the quality of the industry’s service on the consumers’ aggregate 
income is not clear.    
     We derive the steady state of the royalties-based optimally controlled industry, 
present its comparative statics and identify the conditions that allow for a stable path 
to the optimal steady state along which the number of broadcasters gradually 
converges to the optimal steady state. In contrast to the observed consolidation and 
return to concentration in the aftermath of deregulatory reforms in the United States, 
Italy, Germany and Japan (cf., Noam, 1992; Motta and Polo, 1997; Hazlet, 2005), our 
analysis of royalties-based optimal control of the OTA broadcasting industry reveals a 
possible convergence to a steady state with a larger number of broadcasters. 
     To set the stage and motivate the royalties-based optimal control of the OTA 
broadcasting industry, Section 2 presents the industry’s basic dynamics and Section 3 
computes and illustrates the industry’s steady state under ad hoc fixed royalties and 
adjustment to above-normal profits. Section 4 formalizes the multifaceted effects of 
broadcasts on the consumers’ utility: a quality enhanced positive direct effect, a 
negative indirect effect of diverting budget from other, private, goods, the 
aforementioned opposing effects of the quality of the broadcasting industry’s service 
on the consumers’ aggregate income and budget, and the positive effect of the 
spectrum royalties on the provision of public goods. Section 4 assembles these utility 
aspects and the OTA broadcasting industry’s dynamics described in Section 2 into the 
construction of the social planner’s optimal control problem. Section 5 derives the 
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optimal steady-state number of the OTA broadcasters and its comparative statics. 
Section 6 analyzes the possibility of convergence to the industry’s optimal steady 
state.  
 
2. DYNAMICS OF THE INDUSTRY 
Let n(t) denote the number of suppliers (broadcasters) of OTA transmitted programs 
(broadcasts) at time t. At every instance t each broadcaster uses a single channel and 
delivers a single program. Let the broadcasters be technologically and location-wise 
identical and paying royalties, g(t), to the government for using a band at t. Also let 
the width of each band (channel) be technologically determined and fixed, ω , and the 
bands evenly spread along a fixed homogeneous spectrum space set aside for the 
broadcasting industry, Ŝ . Then the buffer zones between bands evenly diminish as the 
number of broadcasters increases and broadcasts are equally receivable by any 
consumer. For tractability, let us further assume that the consumers are located at an 
identical, physically unobstructed, distance from the broadcasters (e.g., a flat circular 
area with broadcasters at its centre and residents in its circumference). Then all 
broadcasts are equally receivable by all. In our setting, the programs’ consumers are 
also users of broadcast time. Namely, they advertise their services during programs.  
     Broadcasters enter (exit) the industry as long as the above-normal profit (ANP) 
from broadcasting is positive (negative). That is,   
n(t) ANP(t)= φ ,          (1) 
where 0φ >   reflects  the speed of adjustment (ease of entry and exit). Sunk costs 
deter entry and exit. The larger the broadcasters’ sunk costs are, the lower the speed 
of adjustment of the number of broadcasters to the above-normal profit from 
broadcasting. The sunk costs are assumed to be time-invariant and hence φ  is taken to 
be a scalar. With Ŝ  denoting the spectrum available to the broadcasting industry, 
ˆ0 n(t) S /≤ ≤ ω .  
     From the perspective of the consumers, the overall quality of the aerially 
transmitted programs, Q(t), rises with variety, depth and reception. While the variety 
and depth of programs rise with the number of channels and their competition, 
interferences intensify as the buffer zone between the channels diminishes. In other 
words, reception is positively related to the size of the unused spectrum (S), which is 
given by: 
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ˆS(t) S n(t)= −ω .          (2) 
Consequently,  
ˆQ(t) q(n(t),S(t)) q(n(t), (S n(t)))= = −ω ,       (3) 
where, ˆq(0,S) 0= . The direct, variety, effect of the number of channels on quality, is 
positive but not increasing: nq 0>  and nnq 0≤ . The indirect effect of the number of 
channels on quality, through deteriorating reception, is negative: sq−ω , where sq 0>  
and (for simplicity) unchanged, ssq 0= . Up to a critical number of channels, n  
( ˆn S /< ω), the positive variety effect dominates the negative interference effect: 
n n sQ (q q ) 0
>
<
= −ω =  for n n
<
>
= . 
     The overall demand for broadcasts increases with quality. Consequently, the 
broadcasting industry’s aggregate revenue from advertisements and subscription fees 
at any t is R(Q(t)) with R(0) 0= , QR 0>  and, for tractability, QQR 0= . Assuming 
that the consumers do not have favourite channels, the industry’s aggregate revenue is 
equally distributed. The instantaneous operational cost of each channel is, for 
simplicity, time-invariant, c, and so also is the (foregone) normal profit attainable in 
other industries, π . 
     In sum, the change in the number of broadcasters (channels) is given by: 
ˆn(t) {[R(q(n(t), (S n(t)))) / n(t)] [c g(t)]}= φ −ω − + π+ .     (4) 
The royalties charged on bands reduce the above-normal profit and, subsequently, the 
number of broadcasters. In turn, the variety and depth of programs is reduced, but the 
reception of each broadcast is improved. If the former (latter) effect dominates the 
latter (former), the industry’s overall revenue decreases (increases), the number of 
broadcasters is diminished (increased), and so forth. As long as the broadcasting 
industry is not in the optimal steady state, time-invariant royalties are not optimal. In 
the following sections we firstly demonstrate the role of fixed ad hoc royalties in the 
said process and then the determination of the optimal royalties.  
 
3. STEADY STATE OF THE INDUSTRY UNDER FIXED AD HOC ROYALTIES 
Recalling our assumptions, R(0) 0=  and the slope of the industry’s revenue curve is 
Q n s
dR R (q q ) 0
dn
>
<
= −ω =  for n n
<
>
=                   (5) 
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as depicted in Figure 1 by the inverted parabola. With fixed royalties, 0g , the 
industry’s cost function is linear in n, 0C(t) (c g )n(t)= + π+ . The interior steady state 
of the industry is in the intersection between the industry’s revenue curve and cost 
line, which, as displayed by the arrows along the horizontal axis, is asymptotically 
stable. The larger the speed of adjustment is, the faster the convergence of the number 
of OTA broadcasters to the steady state number, ssn . In the extreme case of φ→∞ , 
adjustment to steady state is immediate. Namely, ssn(t) n=  at any t as the immediate 
adjustment of the broadcasters’ number exhausts the broadcasting industry’s above 
normal profit:  
0
ss ss ssˆANP(t) R(q(n , (S n ))) / n (c g ) 0 t= −ω − + π+ = ∀ .             (6) 
High sunk costs and strict regulations diminish the speed of adjustment. In the polar 
extreme case of no-adjustment ( 0φ = ), the number of OTA broadcasters is time 
invariant, NAn , and the above normal profit is a scalar, Δ , which can be positive, 
negative or zero. In this case, 
NA NA NA0
ˆR(q(n , (S n ))) (c g )n 0−ω − + π+ + Δ = .     (7) 
If, by fluke, 0Δ = , the number of OTA broadcasters under no-adjustment is identical 
to the aforementioned steady-state number of OTA broadcasters.  
     To illustrate the difference in the number of OTA broadcasters under the said two 
polar cases, we consider some computationally convenient specifications. In 
particular, we specify the overall quality of the service of the OTA broadcasting 
industry for the consumers to be given by    
ˆQ(t) n(t)[S n(t)]= −ω                      (8) 
where, as indicated by Eq. (2), Ŝ n−ω  is the size of the unused spectrum set aside for 
broadcasting. This parabolic specification of Q reflects properties that can be resulted 
from the opposite effects of n on variety and reception: n ˆQ S 2 n 0
>
<
= − ω =  as ˆn S / 2
<
>
= ω  
and nnQ 2 0= − ω< . Namely, the marginal effect of the number of OTA broadcasters 
on the overall quality of the service of the OTA broadcasting industry is initially 
positive but diminishing, and when the number of OTA broadcasters is larger than 
Ŝ / 2ω  the positive effect of n on variety is dominated by the negative effect of 
congestion on reception.  
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     We assume that the marginal revenue (i.e., increment in revenues from 
subscription fees and commercial advertisements) from the quality of the broadcasting 
industry service is constant (p) and, for simplicity, also time-invariant. That is, p can 
be interpreted as the consumers’ price of broadcasts’ quality. In which case, the OTA 
broadcasting industry revenue function is 
R(t) pQ(t)= .           (9) 
By substituting the right-hand side of Eq. (8) for Q into this specification of R, the 
industry’s revenue function is 
2ˆR(t) pSn(t) p n(t)= − ω                      (10) 
and the industry’s above-normal profit is 
ˆANP(t) (pS p n(t)) (c g)= − ω − + π+ .                            (11) 
     By setting ANP to zero, the steady-state number of OTA broadcasters is 
ss 1 c gˆn S
p
⎡ ⎤+ π+
= −⎢ ⎥ω ⎣ ⎦
.                  (12) 
This steady-state number of OTA broadcasters is smaller than the number that can be 
accommodated, Ŝ /ω . The smaller the broadcasting service’s mark-up [p / (c g)]+ π+  
is, the larger the difference between the number of broadcasters that can be 
accommodated and the steady state number. By lowering the royalties per band, the 
government increases the mark-up for OTA broadcasters and, in turn, their steady-
state number.  
     By substituting (10) into (7), the number of OTA broadcasters under no-
adjustment ( NAn ) is  
NA
1 c gˆn S
p
⎡ ⎤+ π+ + Δ
= −⎢ ⎥ω ⎣ ⎦
.                  (13) 
The number of OTA broadcasters under no-adjustment with positive (negative) above 
normal profit is smaller (larger) than the steady-state number of OTA broadcasters. 
As displayed by Figure 1, these numbers are given by the intersection of the dashed 
lines (c g )n+ π+ + Δ  with the industry total revenue curve. As the rigidities (high 
sunk costs and regulations on entry and exit) causing no-adjustment are moderated, 
convergence to steady state begins. The greater the speed of adjustment is, the faster 
the convergence of the number of the OTA broadcasters from NAn  to 
ssn . 
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   Figure 1. Number of broadcasters under fixed royalties 
 
 
4. OPTIMAL CONTROL OF THE INDUSTRY 
Let us now analyze a socially optimal determination of royalties and adjustment of 
broadcasters’ number. In the proposed setting, technology is fixed, the government 
allows entry and exist, yet it indirectly controls the number of broadcasters by 
choosing the trajectory of royalties {g} per band that maximizes the consumers’ 
lifetime utility. The royalties received by the government from the broadcasters at t, 
n(t)g(t) , are immediately directed to finance public services.  
     Consumers are infinitely lived and have an aggregate income, Y(t), of which  
R(q(t)) is spent on access to, and advertisements in, the OTA broadcasts and the 
remainder, Y(t)-R(q(t)), on private goods. Broadcasts have two opposing effects on 
aggregate income. On the one hand, they disseminate information that enhances 
knowledge, forms standards of performance and generates transactions. On the other 
hand, they divert time from work and active investment in human and social capitals. 
These opposing effects are intensified by the quality of the broadcasts. With 1 0ϕ >  
indicating the information dissemination effect, 2 0ϕ >  the production-effort 
diversion effect of broadcasts, and  Ŷ 0>  the aggregate income attainable when the 
said effects offset one another (or nil), the consumers’ aggregate income is: 
1 2
ˆY(t) Y ( )Q(t)= + ϕ −ϕ .                                    (14) 
0
R  
C  
ss ˆn( 0) n n( 0) S /Δ > Δ < ω  
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     With (14) and the explicit specifications (8) and (9) of the broadcasting industry’s 
quality of service and revenue and with 0α >  indicating the consumers’ direct 
marginal instantaneous utility from the quality of the broadcasts and 0β >  their 
marginal instantaneous utility from the private goods, the consumers’ instantaneous 
utilities from the quality of the broadcasts ( 1u ) and from consuming the private good 
( 2u ) are: 
2
1
ˆu (t) [Sn(t) n(t) ]= α −ω                   (15) 
and  
2
2 1 2
ˆˆu (t) {Y ( p)[Sn(t) n(t) ]}= β + ϕ −ϕ − −ω .               (16) 
     In addition, the consumers’ derive instantaneous utility ( 3u ) from the investment 
of the spectrum’s royalties, n(t)g(t), in the provision of public goods. In contrast to the 
constant marginal utilities assumed in (15) and (16), diminishing marginal utility from 
the spectrum’s royalties spent on the provision of the public goods, 3u 0′′ < , cannot be 
compromised for analytical simplicity since g is the public planner’s control variable. 
A second order polynomial that ensures a diminishing positive marginal utility from 
the public goods at the steady-state financing level n*g* and reflects the consumers’ 
dislike of deviations from that optimal stationary contribution of the spectrum’s 
royalties to the provision of public goods is considered: 
2
3 1 2u (t) [n(t)g(t)] [n(t)g(t) n *g*]= γ − γ −                 (17) 
where 1 2 0γ > γ > .
2  
     With the time index omitted for compactness, the consumers’ overall instantaneous 
utility is:3 
                                                 
2 Other specifications (e.g., 3u ng, 0= γ γ > ) were considered. The specification indicated in (17) 
facilitates the computation of the steady state. 
3 As there is no strong interaction between public goods’ consumption and private goods’ consumption, 
the assumed separability of the utilities derived from these consumptions is sensible. In justifying the 
assumed separability between the utilities generated from the use of the broadcasting service and from 
the rest of the private good consumption, we stress that these service and private good consumption are 
aggregates and that the sign of the cross derivatives of a utility function defined on these aggregates is 
not clear. Some components of the broadcasting service are substitute to some components of the 
consumer’s aggregate consumption of the rest of the private goods, but complementing others. For 
example, watching OTA broadcast sport competitions complements the use of some household’s 
facilities and utilities and the consumption of home-made food’s ingredients, but substitutes attendance 
of sport competitions, use of transportation and stadium related services and consumption of fast food. 
For this reason, and for tractability, the cross derivative is assumed to be nil. 
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1 2 3
2 2 2
1 2 1 2
u u u u
ˆ ˆˆ(Sn n ) [Y ( p)(Sn n )] [ng] [ng n *g*] .
= + +
= α −ω +β + ϕ −ϕ − −ω + γ − γ −
          (18) 
     The public planner’s decision-problem is postulated to be choosing the trajectory 
of royalties that maximizes t
0
e u(t)dt
∞
−ρ∫  subject to: 
ˆn [pn(S n) / n (c g )]= φ −ω − + + π .                       (21) 
The current value Hamiltonian associated with this problem is  
2 2
1 2 1 2
ˆˆH Y [ ( p)](Sn n ) [ng] [ng n *g*]
ˆ[p(S n) c g ].
= β + α +β ϕ −ϕ − −ω + γ − γ −
+ λφ −ω − − −π
                (22) 
The co-state variable, λ , reflects the public planner’s current shadow value of 
broadcasts’ variety and competition. The Hamiltonian is concave in the control 
variable. As long as 21 2 22[ ( p)] 2 g 0α +β ϕ −ϕ − ω+ γ > , it is also concave in the state 
variable. In which case, the following Pontryagin’s maximum-principle conditions 
are, by the Mangasarian (1966) theorem, sufficient: 
n 1 2
1 2
ˆH [ ( p)](S 2 n)
[ 2 (ng n *g*)]g ( p )
λ = − +ρλ = − α +β ϕ −ϕ − − ω
− γ − γ − + φ ω+ρ λ
                        (23) 
g 1 2H [ 2 (ng n *g*)]n 0= γ − γ − −λφ =                 (24) 
ˆn [p(S n) c g ]= φ −ω − − −π                   (25) 
t
t
lim e H(t) 0−ρ
→∞
= .                   (26) 
By differentiating (24) with respect to time, substituting (23) for λ  and (24) for λ  and 
rearranging terms, the Euler equation for the optimal change in royalties on bands is: 
1 2 1 2
2
2
1 2
2
2
ˆ[ ( p)](S 2 n) [ 2 (ng n *g*)][ g ( p )n]g
2 n
[ 2 (2ng n *g*)] n
2 n
φ α +β ϕ −ϕ − − ω + γ − γ − φ − φ ω+ρ
=
γ
γ − γ −
+
γ
         .(27) 
The change in the optimal royalties is moderated by the public planner’s rate of time 
preference and the broadcasters’ marginal return on the quality of programs. The 
change in the optimal royalties rises with the consumers’ marginal direct utility from 
the broadcasts and with the net effect of the broadcasts on the consumers’ aggregate 
income ( 1 2ϕ −ϕ ), proportionally to the  product of the consumers’ marginal utility 
from the private goods and the available broadcasting spectrum. 
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5. INDUSTRY’S OPTIMAL STEADY STATE  
From the necessary conditions (23), (24) and (25) we obtain that in steady state: 
1 2 1
ˆ[ ( p)](S 2 n*) g * ( p ) * 0− α +β ϕ −ϕ − − ω − γ + φ ω+ρ λ =              (27) 
 1* ( / )n *λ = γ φ                   (28) 
ˆg* p(S n*) c= −ω − − π .                 (29) 
By substituting (28) and (29) into (27) the steady-state number of broadcasters is: 
1 2 1
1 2 1
ˆ[ ( p) p]Sn*
2[ ( p)] [2p / ]
α +β ϕ −ϕ − + γ
=
α +β ϕ −ϕ − ω+ γ ω+ρ φ
.                         (30) 
     Corollary 1. The steady-state number of broadcasters rises with the consumers’ 
marginal direct utility from broadcasts. 
Proof: 1 2
1 2 1
ˆ( / )Sn * 0
{2[ ( p)] [2p / ]}
γ ρ φ∂
= >
∂α α +β ϕ −ϕ − ω+ γ ω+ρ φ
. 
     Corollary 2. If the broadcasts’ information-dissemination effect on the consumers’ 
aggregate income ( 1ϕ ) dominates (is dominated by) the sum of the production-effort-
diversion effect ( 2ϕ ) and the consumers’ price of broadcasts’ quality (p), then the 
steady-state number of broadcasters increases (decreases) with the consumers’ 
marginal utility from the other private goods.   
Proof: 1 1 2 2
1 2 1
ˆ( / )( p)Sn * 0
{2[ ( p)] [2p / ]}
>
<
γ ρ φ ϕ −ϕ −∂
= =
∂β α +β ϕ −ϕ − ω+ γ ω+ρ φ
 as 1 2( p) 0
>
<
ϕ −ϕ − = . 
     Corollary 3. If the broadcasts’ information-dissemination effect on the consumers’ 
aggregate income dominates (is dominated by) the sum of the production-effort-
diversion effect and the consumers’ price of broadcasts’ quality, then the steady-state 
number of broadcasters decreases (increases) with the consumers’ marginal utility 
from the public goods financed by the spectrum royalties:   
Proof: 1 2 2
1 1 2 1
ˆ( / )[ ( p)]Sn * 0
{2[ ( p)] [2p / ]}
<
>
− ρ φ α +β ϕ −ϕ −∂
= =
∂γ α +β ϕ −ϕ − ω+ γ ω+ρ φ
 as 1 2( p) 0
>
<
ϕ −ϕ − = . 
     Corollary 4. The steady-state number of broadcasters rises with the broadcasts’ 
information-dissemination effect on the consumers’ aggregate income. 
Proof: 1 2
1 1 2 1
ˆ( / )Sn * 0
{2[ ( p)] [2p / ]}
βγ ρ φ∂
= >
∂ϕ α +β ϕ −ϕ − ω+ γ ω+ρ φ
. 
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     Corollary 5. The steady-state number of broadcasters decreases with the 
broadcasts’ production-effort-diversion effect on the consumers’ aggregate income. 
Proof: 1 2
2 1 2 1
ˆ( / )Sn * 0
{2[ ( p)] [2p / ]}
−βγ ρ φ∂
= <
∂ϕ α +β ϕ −ϕ − ω+ γ ω+ρ φ
. 
     Corollary 6. If the public planner’s rate of time preference is larger (smaller) than 
2 1 12 [ (1 )p ] /ωφ ϕ + − γ −α −βϕ β , then the steady-state number of broadcasters 
decreases (increases) with the consumers’ price of broadcasts’ quality.  
Proof: 1 1 2 1 2
1 2 1
ˆ{ ( / ) 2 [ ( p) p]}Sn * 0
p {2[ ( p)] [2p / ]}
<
>
−γ β ρ φ + ω α +β ϕ −ϕ − + γ∂
= =
∂ α +β ϕ −ϕ − ω+ γ ω+ρ φ
  
as 1 1 2( / ) 2 [ p] 2 ( p)
>
<
β ρ φ + ω α +βϕ + γ = ω ϕ + , which by rearrangement can be displayed 
as 2 1 12 [ (1 )p ] /
>
<
ρ= ωφ ϕ + − γ −α −βϕ β . 
     Corollary 7. The steady-state number of broadcasters decreases with the band’s 
width: 
2
1 2 1
2
1 2 1
ˆ2[ ( p) p] Sn * 0
{2[ ( p)] [2p / ]}
− α +β ϕ −ϕ − + γ∂
= <
∂ω α +β ϕ −ϕ − ω+ γ ω+ρ φ
 
     Corollary 8. If the consumers’ price of broadcasts’ quality is larger (smaller) than 
2 1 1[ ( p ) ] /β ϕ + −ϕ −α γ  (the consumers’ net loss of utility from private consumption 
due to a marginal improvement in the broadcasts’ quality, deflated by the consumers’ 
marginal utility from the spectrum’s royalties), then the steady-state number of 
broadcasters decreases (increases) with the public planner’s rate of time preferences. 
Proof: 1 1 2 1 2
1 2 1
ˆ( / )[ ( p) p]Sn * 0
{2[ ( p)] [2p / ]}
<
>
− γ φ α +β ϕ −ϕ − + γ∂
= =
∂ρ α +β ϕ −ϕ − ω+ γ ω+ρ φ
  
as 1 1 2p ( p)
>
<
α +βϕ + γ =β ϕ + , which by rearrangement can be displayed as  
2 1 1p [ ( p ) ] /
>
<
= β ϕ + −ϕ −α γ . The  
 
     Corollary 9. If the marginal revenue from the broadcasts’ quality is larger 
(smaller) than 2 1 1[ ( p ) ] /β ϕ + −ϕ −α γ , then the steady-state number of broadcasters 
increases (decreases) with the speed of adjustment to the broadcast industry’s above 
normal profit. 
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Proof: 1 1 2 1 2
1 2 1
ˆ[ ( p) p]Sn * 0
{2 [ ( p)] [2p / ]}
>
<
γ ρ α +β ϕ −ϕ − + γ∂
= =
∂φ φ α +β ϕ −ϕ − ω+ γ ω+ρ φ
  
as 1 1 2p ( p)
>
<
α +βϕ + γ =β ϕ + , which by rearrangement can be displayed as  
2 1 1p [ ( p ) ] /
>
<
= β ϕ + −ϕ −α γ . 
Recalling that entry and exist are deterred by sunk costs, the steady-state number of 
broadcasters decreases (increases) with the broadcasters’ sunk costs if the consumers’ 
price of broadcasts’ quality is larger (smaller) than the consumers’ net loss of utility 
from private consumption due to a marginal improvement in the broadcasts’ quality, 
deflated by the consumers’ marginal utility from the public goods financed by the 
spectrum’s royalties. 
     Corollary 10. The steady-state number of broadcasters decreases with the size of 
the spectrum allocated to broadcasting, but otherwise decreases, if the difference 
between the information-dissemination effect and the production-effort-diversion 
effect on the consumers’ aggregate income satisfies the following inequality:  
1 1 1 2 1 1
1 0.5 1 0.5p max{( p), p } ( ) p min{( p), p }⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞α ρ α ρ− α+γ +γ + < ϕ −ϕ < − α+γ +γ +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟β ω φω β ω φω⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
. 
Proof: 1 2 1
1 2 1
[ ( p) p]n *
ˆ 2[ ( p)] [2p / ]S
α +β ϕ −ϕ − + γ∂
=
α +β ϕ −ϕ − ω+ γ ω+ρ φ∂
. The numerator and 
denominator have the same sign only when the said inequality is satisfied. 
      From equation (29), the directions of the effects of the model parameters on the 
steady-state royalties on bands (g*) are opposite to those on the steady-state number 
of broadcasters. 
 
6. STABILITY OF THE OPTIMAL STEADY STATE 
For assessing the stability of the steady state (n*,g*) we evaluate the Jacobian of the 
differential equation system (25) and (27) in steady state 
2 1 2 1 2 1
3
2
* *
n g
* *
n g
p
2 [ g*(2pn* g*/ ) ( p) p] (2 g*n* )
{ [p g*/n*] }
n*
n n
g g
−φ ω −φ
ωφ γ − ω −α−β ϕ −ϕ − − γ + γ −γ ρ
φ ω− +ρ
γ
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ = ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
                     (31) 
and its eigenvalues 
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( )21,2 *n0.5[ (g* /n*)] 0.5 [ (g* /n*)] 4 g p [(p g* /n*) ]μ = ρ−φ ± ρ−φ − φ −φ ω ω− +ρ . (32) 
An inspection of equation (32) suggests that if the public planner’s rate of time 
preference and the broadcasters’ sunk costs are sufficiently high, the Jacobian’s trace 
in steady state, [ (g* /n*)]ρ−φ , might be positive. In which case, the steady state is 
not asymptotically stable. This argument is based on dominant direct effects of the 
public planner’s rate of time preference and the broadcasters’ sunk costs on 
[ (g* /n*)]ρ−φ . Their indirect effects on [ (g* /n*)]ρ−φ  through g* /n *  are not clear. 
From equation (29), ˆg* /n* [(pS c ) / n*] p= − − π − ω . Recalling corollaries 8 and 9, 
ˆ[(pS c ) / n*] p− − π − ω  increases (decreases) with the public planner’s rate of time 
preference, but decreases (increases) with the broadcasters’ sunk costs, if the marginal 
revenue from the broadcasts’ quality is larger (smaller) than 2 1 1[ ( p ) ] /β ϕ + −ϕ −α γ . 
Yet even with (g* /n*) 0ρ−φ > , there can be convergence to steady state if 
*
ng p [(p g * /n*) ] 0Ω ≡ −φ ω ω− +ρ < . In this case, 1 0μ > and 2 0μ <  and the steady 
state is a saddle point. By appropriate setting of the royalties, the public planner can 
let the broadcasting industry gradually approach the steady state along the initially 
nearest arm of the single stable manifold. This case is illustrated by Figure 2. While it 
is clear that the slope of the isoclines n 0=  is negative ( p )− ω , the slope of the 
isoclines g 0=  is not clear: 
2 1 2 1 2 1
3
2
2 [ g*(2pn * g*/ ) ( p) p] (2 g*n * )dg (g 0)
dn n * { [p g*/n*] }
ωφ γ − ω −α−β ϕ −ϕ − − γ + γ −γ ρ
= = −
γ φ ω− +ρ
. (33) 
As can be seen from this expression, with ρ  being large the positive slope of the 
isoclines n 0=  portrayed in Figure 2 is supported by a large marginal utility from the 
public good in steady state: 1 22 g*n *γ > γ . A positive slope is also supported by a 
large direct marginal utility from the quality of the broadcast (α ) and an information-
dissemination effect that dominates the effort-diversion effect of broadcasts on the 
consumers’ aggregate income ( 1 2ϕ > ϕ ). Starting from a highly regulated industry 
with a small number of broadcasters ( 0n ), the left upward sloped converging arm is 
relevant for the public planner. Along this arm the number of broadcasters increases 
gradually despite the rising royalties. 
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Figure 2. An unstable steady state — a saddle point 
 
     In contrast, if the public planner’s rate of time preference and the broadcasters’ 
sunk costs are sufficiently low so that (g* /n*) 0ρ−φ < , and if 
*
ng p [(p g * /n*) ] 0Ω ≡ −φ ω ω− +ρ > , then the steady state (n*,g*) is asymptotically 
stable. If, in addition, 2[ (g* /n*)] 04ρ−φ < φΩ , the steady state is note a node and the 
industry’s optimal trajectory to the steady state is characterised by damped 
oscillations of the number of broadcasters and royalties, as displayed in Figure 3.    
 
 
Figure 3. A stable steady state approached along a spiral 
n 0=  
Ŝ /ω  
g  
 0  
g 0=  
n *
 g* 
0n  
n 0=  
Ŝ /ω  
g  
0  
g 0=  
n *
 g* 
0n  
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7. CONCLUSION 
The advent of digital transmission technologies has done little to relieve constraints 
on the amount of spectrum allocated to the broadcasting industry. The perennial 
tradeoff between variety and reception still prevails. This tradeoff is likely to be most 
prominent under a deregulatory scheme. Spectrum is a state-owned, time-invariant, 
scarce natural resource. As in the case of any other state-owned natural resource, 
governments are entitled to charge royalties on its use and can direct these revenues to 
finance public services. Therefore, in addition to the direct benefits from the service 
provided by the broadcasting industry, the indirect benefits to consumers from the 
public services financed by the royalties on this natural resource were taken into 
account in the determination of the socially optimal allocation of bands to 
broadcasters. For setting the state’s royalties on spectrum, we proposed an optimal 
control model that takes into account the aforesaid aspects, entry and exit of 
broadcasters in accordance with above-normal  profit and at a rate moderated by sunk 
costs, and a possible positive and negative effects of broadcasts on consumers’ 
income. We derived the socially optimal steady-state of the broadcasting industry and 
its comparative statics and analyzed the possibility of convergence to this steady state. 
In contrast to the observed consolidation and return to concentration in the aftermath 
of deregulatory reforms in the United States, Italy, Germany and Japan, our analysis 
reveals that optimal control of the broadcasting industry with variable royalties on 
bands can gradually lead the industry to a steady state with a larger number of 
broadcasters. Extensions of the analysis may consider the alternative usages of the 
spectrum and determine the optimal portion of the spectrum allocated to OTA 
broadcasts and the optimal band-width.  
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